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KATHLEEN WATERS* 
EVERYBODY HAD HIS OWN GRINGO: THE CIA AND THE 
CONTRAS. By GLENN GARVIN. Riverside, NJ.: Brassey's. 1992. Pp. 
288. 
News of the Nicaraguan war of the late 1980s filtered back to the 
United States in bits and pieces through assorted AP press reports and 
magazine articles. Having been released according to the political 
winds in the United States, the coverage was erratic and lacking in 
depth. If asked about the Nicaraguan war today, most people likely will 
remember only the infamous Iran-Contra scandal, and few know many 
details of even that except for Oliver North's name. Critical focus has 
always centered on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. 
government's involvement in the war. Lost in the usual analysis is the 
heart and soul of the Nicaraguan revolution: the Contras. 
Although the United States may have provided funds whenever 
the CIA or State Department could squeeze them out of Congress, it 
was the people of Nicaragua who fought the war: campesinos, bankers, 
merchants, ranchers, and anyone else who believed the Sandinistas 
would ruin Nicaragua took up arms and fled to the jungles of Nicara-
gua and Honduras to fight for their country. It was these people, the 
Contras, who fought the war. Before Oliver North knew there was a 
problem in Nicaragua, the Contras were fighting. And when the 
United States was no longer providing funds, the Contras were still 
fighting. 
The United States and its people are not alone in ignoring the 
Contras. Violeta Chammoro, elected the leader of Nicaragua in 1990, 
offered no thanks or praise to the Contras, despite the fact that they 
were responsible for forcing Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega into 
holding an election. 
In Everybody Had His Own Gringo: The aA and the Contras, l 
author Glenn Garvin changes the typical focus adopted with respect 
to the Nicaraguan war by telling the story of the war from the perspec-
tive of the Contras. Filled with anecdotes about the war that the Con-
tras fought-not necessarily the war we saw-Garvin's book not only 
* Solicitations Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
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displays a deep respect for those who fought for their country, but also 
exhibits an understanding of the culture and people that is so often 
missing from reports of the war. Garvin recounts the entire war, from 
the overthrow of the Somoza family, which placed the Sandinistas in 
power, to the election of Violeta Chammoro, which supposedly re-
moved the Sandinistas from power. The book focuses on a variety of 
Contras, including commanders, fighters, and spies. The author also 
includes an account of actions by the CIA and the United States. 
Instead of the discussing events in Washington, D.C., however, Garvin 
emphasizes what the CIA was doing in Nicaragua, and what response 
the CIA received in Nicaragua from the Contras. The title of the book 
symbolizes the importance of specific CIA individuals to specific Con-
tras, thus illustrating how the Contras needed, and ultimately used, the 
CIA to fight the war.2 
The pattern of Garvin's account is somewhat atypical. Each char-
acter is introduced as his or her story falls in the chronology of events. 
Garvin then breaks from chronology to give an in-depth background 
of each individual. The result confuses the timing of events for the 
reader, but provides a better understanding of the individuals involved. 
Certainly, confusion is unavoidable in telling the story of over 100 
actors in the Nicaraguan war, but in the end Garvin ensures that his 
story is clear. 
Everybody Had His Own Gringo begins with a brief history lesson 
of Nicaraguan politics dating back to the 1800s.3 The involvement of 
foreign governments in Nicaraguan politics began in 1845. Formal 
United States involvement in Nicaragua did not occur until 1933, when 
the United States supervised the election of Juan Scala.4 Nicaraguan 
politics were always turbulent, and the seeds of Somoza's future rule 
were ensconced with the election of Scala, who was an uncle by mar-
riage to Somoza.5 
2 Id. at 83,246. Each Contra politician used personal support from a CIA member as political 
clout with one another. Id. at 83. Whoever was more closely connected to an official with power 
in the U.S. government inevitably had more power among the Contras: "everybody has his own 
gringo." Id. Even in the end, when divisiveness marred the Contra directorate, if one member 
got tickets to the inaugural ball, for example, the others had to call in their U.S. connections to 
do the same. Id. at 246. 
3 The history lesson is prefaced by an anecdote about Augusto Sandino, the guerrilla com-
mander, and a young journalist, Jose Roman, who was going to write a novel about the leader. 
Id. at 7. Sandino asked Roman, who spoke English, the meaning of a phrase the Marines often 
used: "goddamned country." When Roman replied in Spanish that it meant maldito pais, Sandino 
roared with laughter and insisted that this be the title of the book. Id. 
4Id. at 8. U.S.-born soldier offortune William Walker took control of Nicaragua in 1855, but 
was assassinated shortly thereafter. Id. 
5Id. at 9. 
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The author introduces Somoza as a failure in every job he tried, 
until he settled upon political tyranny.6 Educated in the United States, 
the Somoza family had a pointed affinity for the more verbose features 
of U.S. culture, and occasionally even talked like gangsters. 7 Garvin 
explains Somoza's tyranny, highlighting the narrative with the execu-
tion of Augusto Sandino, the guerrilla fighter, as a symbol of Somoza's 
ruthlessness.s The fall of the Somoza dynasty began in 1972 when an 
earthquake killed IS,OOO people and left the country in a shattered 
economic condition. The downfall of the dynasty continued in 1975 
with the assassination of the popular La Prensa editor, Pedro Joaquin 
Chamorro.9 Realizing that the climate was perfect for a change in 
government, Daniel Ortega began to plan a coup. Despite his Com-
munist ideology, Ortega formed an alliance with the business commu-
nity and middle class, and eventually forced Somoza to flee the country 
onJuly 17,1979.10 By September 21, 19S9, the Ortega-inspired Sand-
inista plan to cripple the economy led many people to realize that they 
merely had traded one tyrant for another.ll 
Although the anti-Sandinista movement had broad-based support 
in its early stages, the movement lacked supplies and funds. The revo-
lution against the Sandinistas had planted seeds in many different 
places-from Honduras,12 to Miami,13 to the same mountain fortress 
of Sandino where defecting Sandinista commander Pedro Joaquin 
Gonzalez was stationed.14 Gonzalez was among the first to turn and 
take up arms against the Sandinistas in May 19S0. Yet, when he was 
killed that year, the revolution did not die. 15 The early stages of revo-
lution had the support of Nicaraguan people of all echelons. It lacked 
only money. Thinking the United States would not support any move-
ment to overthrow the Sandinistas-because the Carter Administration 
had "pulled the rug" from under Somoza and thereby aided the Sand-
inistas-the anti-Sandinistas looked to other governments and to So-
moza himself for funds. Money, however, was scarce. 
6Id. at 10. 
7 When Tacho Somoza was shot by an assassin, he said, ''I'm done for." Id. at II. 
8Id. 
9Id. at 14. 
10 Id. at 15. 
llId. 
12 Cattle broker Tirzo Moreno fled to Honduras when the Sandinistas were bankrupting his 
industry. Id. at 19. He was eager to return to fight for his country. Id. 
13Id. at 21. 
14Id. at 18. 
15Id. at 20. 
1994] BOOK REVIEWS 181 
The early movement not only was hindered by financial hurdles, 
but it was also plagued with animosity among the different groups, with 
each faction blaming the other for the tyranny of Somoza.16 Many 
different groups united, including the ex-National Guard, which 
formed the Fifteenth of September Legion,17 the anti-Guard of the 
Nicaraguan Democratic Union (UDN),18 the Chammoro brothers,I9 
and other prominent citizens.2o Having such a broad base, however, 
the movement often lacked unity and leadership. Eventually, Enrique 
Bermudez, a key figure in the revolution and in Everybody Had His 
Own Gringo, assumed the leadership of the Legion and ultimately of 
the entire Contra movement. As a Guardsman, Bermudez's record was 
spotless. This enabled him to take command of the revolution without 
alienating those who previously had experienced difficulty with the 
National Guard in Nicaragua. 21 
While funds were simply nonexistent and the "troops" were still 
trying to organize, members of the movement decided to follow the 
path of the Sandinista guerrillas, and began to steal and kidnap for 
money.22 When Bermudez, still in Miami, learned of the thievery, he 
tried unsuccessfully to stop it. Unfortunately, criminal means seemed 
the only route to ameliorating hunger and homelessness. Luckily for 
the Contras, the movement was stopped by the Honduran police be-
fore news of this operation was made public. Otherwise, foreign sup-
port for the anti-Sandinista movement may have been stifled before it 
began. The different factions eventually decided to unite with the UDN 
and the Legion, signing a pact on August 11, 1981, and calling them-
selves the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN).23 
With the financial support of the Argentinean and United States 
governments, Bermudez started to recruit an army. As Garvin explains, 
a civil war was now inevitable.24 The first plan was to blow up two 
bridges on Nicaragua's major highways. Although the plan did not go 
as smoothly as planned-the bridges were only damaged rather than 
destroyed-it opened the Contras up to publicity. Nicaragua was at war. 
16Id. at 24. 
17Id. at 22. 
18Id. at 25. 
19Id. 
200ctavio and Marta Scasa, for example. Id. at 26. 
21Id. 
22Id. at 31. 
23Id. at 38. 
24Id. at 44. 
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Mter Garvin thrusts the reader into the war, he proceeds to de-
scribe assorted personalities and figures in the war. One focus of the 
book is Commander Zero, Eden Pastora, the military hero of the 
Sandinista revolution.25 The CIA spent a considerable amount of 
money trying to convince Pastora to unseat the same regime he had 
put into place.26 Garvin highlights some of the memorable episodes of 
the three-year relationship between the CIA and Pastora. These anec-
dotes shed light on the war, as well as entertain the reader. Provided 
with a history of Pastora before and during his involvement with the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) ,27 the reader acquires a 
clear mental image of the man who inspired a considerable amount 
of publicity for and criticism of the Contras. Fearing the ability of 
Pastora to cause an uprising, the Sandinistas banished him to Cuba 
under house arrest. A friend obtained his release, and Pastora soon 
became associated with the CIA.28 The connection was easier than 
expected as Pastora instantly fell for the slightly bizarre CIA agent 
Duane Clarridge, who wore a monocle and dressed in pastel-colored 
Italian silk safari outfits.29 Nevertheless, the relationship ultimately 
failed. 
Although Pastora obtained millions of dollars and arms from the 
United States, there was very little military progress to show for it. 
Plagued by fears of conspiracy, Pastora did not allow his commanders 
to prepare together for combat, but instead used officers separately for 
logistics, intelligence, and so on.30 On one occasion when his officers 
thought that they should divide the responsibilities of command, Pas-
tora pulled out his gun and threatened suicide.31 His suicide attempts 
were frequent and highlighted his instability.32 That Pastora's own 
commanders often cut off communication with him before conducting 
an attack out of fear that he would call it off at the last minute is further 
proof of his insecurity.33 
Moreover, Pastora's weakness for women often impeded his ability 
to detect spies. One such incident involved Angelica Lug, whom Pas-
25 Pastora seized the Presidential Palace with only two dozen troops by dressing the men in 
National Guard uniforms and acting with sufficient bravado to pull it off. Id. at 50-51. Garvin 
makes clear that this maneuver was not a military operation, but a terrorist one. Id. at 51. 
26Id. at 47. 
27Id. at 48-49. 
28Id. at 54. 
29Id. 
30Id. at 58, 99. 
31Id. at 99. 
32Id. 
33Id. at 101...{)2. 
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tora made chief of personnel despite her marriage to the head of the 
Sandinista marines.34 Mter six months, she left and flew straight to 
Managua. Another incident involved a woman named Marielos Ser-
rano, whom Pastora fell in love with while they were working for the 
Sandinistas.35 When Pastora began to work against the Sandinistas, 
Serrano became his mistress.36 She listened and learned everything: 
safe houses, radio codes, amounts of CIA cash, and the name of every 
opposition leader that had visited Pastora during the preceding two 
years.37 One day she disappeared, only to reappear as a star witness at 
a series of spy trials.38 
The single moment of military glory for Pastora's troops was the 
capture of San Juan del Norte. In recounting the "last hurrah of 
Commander Zero," Garvin describes how before Pastora appeared 
before the press, his older brother pulled him aside and begged, 
"Eden, at least please rub some mud on your boots!" His brother was 
alluding to the fact that Pastora had had nothing to do with the 
military victory.39 This celebration did not last for long. When the 
Sandinistas later counterattacked with heavy artillery and forced a 
retreat from the city, Pastora's ugly side surfaced and he ordered the 
execution of civilians whom he believed to be FSLN sympathizers. Not 
so coincidentally, they also happened to own horses or cattle that 
Pastora then confiscated.4O 
Soon afterward, a man named Per Anker Hansen, who was posing 
as a journalist, attempted to assassinate Pastora. Although speculation 
abounds that the CIA was behind this murder attempt, the agency was 
essentially cleared due to circumstantial evidenceY 
A further strain on Pastora's relationship with the CIA involved 
the kidnapping of a boatload of American leftists from the anti-Contra 
group, Witness for Peace.42 Despite their eventual release, Pastora 
became a marked man in the eyes of his opponents. Joe Fernandez, 
known to the contras as Tomas Castillo, closed the book on Com-
mander Zero by initiating and cementing an agreement among Pas-
34Id. at 102. 
35 See id. at 182-83. 
36Id. at 183. 
37Id. 
38Id. 
39Id. at 135. 
40 Id. at 136. 
41 If CIA officials actually had ordered the assassination, they could have done so quickly, 
and would have had other options besides stalking him for weeks. Id. at 138. 
42 Id. at 142. 
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tora's eight commanders to unite with the Contras from the north.43 
The Costa Rican government granted Pastor political asylum, thereby 
removing him from the war. 
Garvin's tales from the early years of the war, as related through 
the stories of actual Contra fighters, provide insight into the weak-
nesses of the forces and reveal the loyalty that they displayed during 
the war. From the story of 240 newly recruited campesinos who, in their 
first battle, barely defeated six Sandinista soldiers in a jeep,44 to tales 
of victorious ambushes on Sandinista forces,45 to accounts of how the 
lack of logistical planning left an entire battalion without any food or 
medicine for malaria,46 the reader is provided with a sufficient number 
of patchwork stories to piece together a "living" war from the Contra 
perspective. Garvin relates that the Contras experienced serious supply 
problems when they infiltrated Nicaragua. They soon learned, how-
ever, that the local campesinoswere tremendously supportive, providing 
the soldiers with food and medicine.47 In addition, one peasant, Ti-
grillo, easily recruited others to fight for the cause.48 
The campesinos were eager and willing to fight for their country.49 
Garvin tells how on one commander's first infiltration, he returned 
with 180 new recruits, and that the numbers only grew as word 
spread. 50 Although the campesinos were numerous, the former national 
guardsmen did not consider them to be true soldiers, and referred to 
them as comemonos--monkey eaters. Despite their lack of expertise in 
the field, however, it was the campesinos who were most successful in 
recruiting additional forces--numbers were essential in this jungle war. 
Garvin relates the tale of one city, Matagalpa, where the campesinos 
were indifferent to the recruiting efforts of the Contras.51 Initially, the 
Contras were confused by the lack of response to a discussion by their 
leader, Tono, of issues over which the campesinos were known to be 
angry. The Contras eventually learned that the Sandinistas had arrived 
in Matagalpa earlier in the month, posing as Contras, and had arrested 
anyone who demonstrated sympathy. Upon realizing what had hap-
pened, Tono proved that he and his troops were the true FDN by 
43Id. at 143. 
44Id. at 61. 
45Id. at 64. 
46Id. 
47Id. 
48Id. 
49Id. at 76. 
50Id. at 64. 
51Id. at 73. 
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setting an ambush and burning government vehicles.52 The local cam-
pesinos were thrilled, and followed Tono en masse. 53 
Garvin's best tales involve mishaps, or perceived mishaps, by the 
CIA. Referred to as the "Garcia family" in Contraspeak, so that the term 
could be shouted in drunken anger without producing a panic, the 
CIA enjoyed the most intimate relationship with the Contras of any 
branch of the U.S. government.54 Although Garvin describes some of 
the Washington politics involved, he concentrates on the direct inter-
action between the CIA and the Contras. The resources expended by 
the CIA were explained to Congress as money that was needed to halt 
the flow of arms from the Soviet Sandinistas to El Salvador, but ground 
personnel knew that their objective was to overthrow the Sandinista 
government.55 Given the erratic funding from the United States, the 
Contras generally did not trust CIA officials, but learned to work with 
them when the same benefit could be gained through cooperation. 
Garvin considers the CIA's involvement to have been beneficial on an 
intelligence level: for example, when agency personnel undertook to 
teach the Contras strategy. He criticizes the CIA for its ignorance in 
less successful operations, however, such as the mining of Nicaraguan 
harbors.56 
Assorted airdrop mishaps, although a source of anguish to Contras 
in the field, provide a humorous view of the mistakes and lack of 
forethought by CIA officials. On one occasion, a CIA airdrop con-
tained only boots-left-footed boots.57 Another time, a Contra unit 
deep inside Nicaragua opened air-dropped crates only to find tens of 
thousands of sanitary napkins. In a more dangerous snafu, Tono waited 
for days for a military supply drop so that some of his 1100 new recruits 
would be armed if the Sandinistas found them.58 When the drop finally 
arrived, Tono opened the crates to find dinner plates. Thousands of 
metal dinner plates were dropped, "enough for the biggest dinner 
party in the history of Nicaragua. "59 "Maybe when the Sandinistas get 
52Id. 
53Id. at 74. 
54Id. at Ill. 
55Id. at 114-15. 
56 Referring to Clarridge's boast that he got the idea for the mining from his Columbia 
graduate studies of the Russo:Japanese War of 1905, Garvin lambastes the attack by noting that 
"if his studies had touched on the second half of the century, Clarridge might have learned of 
the congressional furor that resulted when the Nixon administration mined North Vietnamese 
ports during an undeclared war in 1972." Id. at 126. 
57Id. at 140. 
58Id. at 149. 
59Id. 
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here," Tono mused, "I'm supposed to invite them to dinner and reason 
with them. "60 In a different set of air drops, one plane carried four 
cartons of Redeye antiaircraft missiles and sixty cartons of foot pow-
der.61 Another contained 100 machine guns and 800,000 tubes of 
toothpaste. 62 
Garvin relates that in 1987, with official and substantial financial 
and technical support from the United States, the Contras began to 
gain enormous ground in the war against the Sandinistas.63 The tough, 
lean years of 1985-87 had led the Sandinistas to believe, mistakenly, 
that the war had basically ended. They considered the energy of the 
Contras to be gone. The Contras proved, however, that they still had 
the necessary energy, lacking only the resources to continue the battle. 
When funds finally arrived, the Contras again posed a formidable 
threat to the Sandinistas. They infiltrated Nicaragua, and were able to 
maintain between 10,000--12,000 troops in the country.64 
In Florida, the United States trained the Contras in specialties 
such as demolitions, communications, paramedical skills, psychologi-
cal operations, and human rights. These skills proved highly beneficial 
in the field. 65 The Contras progressed from an ambush army with 
numbers as their only advantage to a talented and well-supplied force 
able to engage in a full-scale war. They were able to attack economic 
targets strategically, leading city residents to question seriously the 
Sandinistas' credibility. The Contras were winning the war, and the 
Sandinistas knew it. Sandinista officials admitted to losing 2039 troops 
in 1987.66 Daniel Ortega's eventual willingness to negotiate with the 
Contras legitimized the Contra forces and their mission. 
Unfortunately, as Garvin describes, the Contras were unable to 
enjoy their victory due to the "sociopolitical fault lines" throughout the 
ranks at the time of the negotiationsY Various stories of divisiveness 
and criticism mark the final year and final chapters. In the final hours 
of a three-day summit at Sapoa, a cease-fire was negotiated. As Garvin 
tells us, the fear and awe going through Tono's mind during the 
60 ld. 
61 ld. at 198. 
62 ld. Garvin explains that these planes were originally filled with the necessary arms, but 
Honduras would not allow the planes to land because it wanted to force the Contras to buy from 
its own arms supermarket ld. at 199. 
63 See id. at 196-220. 
64 ld. at 197. 
65 ld. at 210. 
66 ld. at 220. 
67 ld. at 221-23. 
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negotiations made him "feel like a ghost in a play."68 In the end, the 
agreement resulted from informal discussions and from a political 
working group, neither of which involved the participation of Contra 
commanders. Although the commanders were able to change a defini-
tive Contra disarmament clause that was to be negotiated at a later 
date, they felt compelled to sign the rest of the agreement due to 
politics and the deadline.69 The Sandinistas were forced to make nu-
merous concessions, but the Contra commanders were the ones to 
shed tears when the agreement was finally signed.70 
Mter the signing, opposition to the Sapoa agreement among the 
Contra leadership was vocal and adamant. Each commander blamed 
the other for giving in to Sandinista demands, and some schemed to 
wreck the upcoming disarmament negotiations, so that the Sapoa 
agreement would fail. In the end, they succeeded in sabotaging the 
Sapoa agreement. 
The final chapter, ''You Won, But Nobody Knows It," describes the 
joy of the Contras and campesinos after Violeta Chammoro's victory in 
an election the Contras forced from Ortega. It also describes their 
sadness at the news that Chammoro was allowing Ortega to retain his 
military post. The Contras had sacrificed so much, and now the poli-
ticians failed to show their most ardent supporters any thanks or 
loyalty.71 In the end, Chammoro was able to settle a disarmament 
negotiation between the Contras and Ortega with the aid ofliquor and 
political maneuvering. She invited both parties over for an alcohol-
laden dinner, and an agreement was reached by the end of the eve-
ning. Although the Contras turned in many of their weapons, they held 
back thousands of rifles and hundreds of machine guns.72 Garvin 
speculates that the Contras are still around, and likely would be willing 
to stop further tyranny. Recent accounts of armed Nicaraguan fighters 
causing strikes and creating political waves proves that Garvin was 
correct in his analysis. The Contras cannot be suppressed for long, 
because they are willing to fight for what they believe. 
Glenn Garvin offers fresh insight into the real force behind the 
Nicaraguan war. His accounts and anecdotes display a keen awareness 
of the people and specifics of the war, making Everybody Had His Own 
Gringo an extremely interesting work. The reader is left wondering not 
68 [d. at 232. 
69 !d. at 234-35. 
70 [d. at 235. 
71 [d. at 258. 
72 [d. at 261. 
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what Ronald Reagan knew during the Contras' movement, but what 
these individual Contras are doing today. Garvin personalizes a war 
that seemed so far away to those who watched the Iran-Contra hearings 
on television. 
The reader is left with a sense that Garvin knows much more than 
the book describes. Many sections of Everybody Had His Own Gringo 
seem to relate only the tip of a very large story. Rather than detailing 
the lives of only one or two of the major players, however, Garvin 
chooses to pique the reader's interest in an entire group of individuals 
who were involved in the war. As a result, the book is an honest attempt 
to provide insight into the real war in Nicaragua, without focusing too 
closely on any specific aspect of the conflict. 
